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Arguably the most foundational principle in perception re-
search is that our experience of the world goes beyond the
retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not
the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm
case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in
depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the
perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really
the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin re-
tain an elliptical appearance even when we know it’s circular?
This question has generated heated debate from Locke and
Hume to the present; but whereas extant arguments rely pri-
marily on introspection, this problem is also open to empirical
test. If tilted coins bear a representational similarity to ellipti-
cal objects, then a circular coin should, when rotated, impair
search for a distal ellipse. Here, nine experiments demonstrate
that this is so, suggesting that perspectival shapes persist in
the mind far longer than traditionally assumed. Subjects saw
search arrays of three-dimensional “coins,” and simply had to
locate a distally elliptical coin. Surprisingly, rotated circular
coins slowed search for elliptical targets, even when subjects
clearly knew the rotated coins were circular. This pattern arose
with static and dynamic cues, couldn’t be explained by strate-
gic responding or unfamiliarity, generalized across shape clas-
ses, and occurred even with sustained viewing. Finally, these
effects extended beyond artificial displays to real-world ob-
jects viewed in naturalistic, full-cue conditions. We conclude
that objects have a remarkably persistent dual character: their
objective shape “out there,” and their perspectival shape “from
here.”
shape | perspective | constancy | representation | philosophy
Look at the golden object in Fig. 1. What shape is it? Thoughit projects an ellipse on the back of the eye, we can tell that
it is really a circle—a “coin” rotated in depth. This experience
illustrates the phenomenon of perceptual constancy, a funda-
mental process by which the mind goes beyond the two-
dimensional (2D) images reaching the eyes to experience the
three-dimensional (3D) world that gave rise to such images—
e.g., to infer a 3D circular disk from the 2D ellipse it projects
(1, 2).
But what is the psychological status of the projected “ellipse”
from which we infer the coin’s 3D shape? Do we “see” the
rotated coin as elliptical and then only “decide” or “judge” that
it is a circular 3D object? Or is the reverse true, such that we
see its 3D shape and then only realize through effortful re-
flection that it projects an ellipse? Or is there some third option
wherein both experiences coexist in the mind—such that the
tilted coin looks, in some sense, both elliptical and circular at
the same time?
Perception in Perspective
The place of one’s own perspective in visual experience is one of
the oldest and most foundational questions in the psychology
and philosophy of perception, in part because it poses a puzzle:
How does objective knowledge of the world arise from our in-
herently subjective experience of it? Locke, Hume, and other
British Empiricists famously held that we perceive only the 2D
projective or perspectival properties of the world, and merely
understand or judge the 3D environment that gave rise to such
properties: “When we set before our eyes a round globe [...] it is
certain that the idea thereby imprinted on our mind is of a flat
circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and
brightness” (ref. 3, para. II, ix, 8). By contrast, scholars such as
Helmholtz and Gibson believed that we primarily perceive 3D
distal properties, and that we can appreciate perspectival prop-
erties only through effort and reflection (as when a painter re-
quires considerable training to capture 3D images on a 2D canvas):
“No one ever saw the world as a flat patchwork of colors—no
infant, no cataract patient, and not even Bishop Berkeley [...].
The notion of a patchwork of colors comes from the art of
painting, not from any unbiased description of visual experi-
ence” (ref. 4, p. 286).
Contemporary vision science has largely upheld the latter
view, at least insofar as perception, action, attention, and other
psychological processes are widely thought to track the distal
properties of objects (i.e., the circularity of the object in Fig. 1),
rather than their perspectival properties (i.e., the ellipticity of
that object’s projection). This can be seen both in foundational
work in cognitive science (e.g., refs. 5 and 6) and also in popular
vision science textbooks. Gregory (7) and Palmer (8), for ex-
ample, suggest that perspectival properties exist merely as pro-
jections on our retinas, and do not persist in mental representations
that guide attention or enter conscious experience: “Perception
involves a kind of inference from sensory data to object-reality.
Further, behavior is not controlled directly by the data, but by the
solutions to the perceptual inferences from the data. If I put a
book on a table [. . .] I act according to the inferred physical
Significance
Our experience of the world goes beyond the light reaching
our eyes: Even when a coin is tilted in depth, we infer the
circular shape it truly has, rather than the ellipse it projects. But
do we ever escape the perspective from which we view the
world? A centuries-old philosophical debate asks whether ob-
jects of different distal shapes bear a representational simi-
larity to one another when their perspectival shapes match.
Here, we test this question empirically. We demonstrate such
representational similarity by showing that perspectival shapes
influence basic mechanisms of perception and attention, even
after distal shape is known. Objects are stamped with the
perceiver’s perspective: We do not see the world completely
separate from our point of view.
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object—table—not according to the brown patch in my eye” (ref.
7, p. 30, see also, ref. 8).†
This theoretical approach is reflected in empirical work as
well. Studies of the human visual pathway have suggested that
“the visual system progressively transforms information from a
retinal to an object-centered reference frame whereby retinal
size is progressively removed from the representation” (ref. 9, p.
432). Indeed, the primacy of distal representations is so psy-
chologically entrenched as to influence even low-level perceptual
phenomena. For example, distal (but not proximal) properties of
stimuli take precedence in how we experience simple 2D shapes
(10), visual adaptation (11, 12), and afterimages (13, 14). Such
representations also extend to phenomena outside visual pro-
cessing itself, including memory (15), grasping (16), and sketching
(17–20). And whereas some theories of object recognition do
emphasize so-called “viewpoint-dependent” representations (where
objects are thought to be recognized on the basis of specific
snapshot-like views), even such models suggest that the ultimate
goal of such processes is a representation of the relevant dis-
tal objects that abstracts away from one’s particular perspective
(e.g., ref. 21).
The Return of the Retinal Image
Despite the apparent scientific consensus about the primacy of
distal properties in perception, this question is actually far from
settled in nearby literatures, including in the philosophy of per-
ception, where the psychological status of perspectival properties
is intensely debated (22–38) (for reviews, see refs. 39 and 40). On
one hand, some philosophers sympathize with the dominant view
in psychology and vision science, arguing that perceptual expe-
riences are primarily or exclusively about distal, environmental
properties (22, 23, 34). At the same time, however, many other
philosophers dissent, arguing that our visual experiences are
better described by a “dual” character, such that perceptual ex-
perience reflects both the true distal properties of objects and
their perspectival properties—a circle and an ellipse at the “same
time,” as it were (24–32, 35–38).
Why the disconnect between these literatures? One reason
might be philosophers’ interest in visual experience itself—how
things look to an observer—rather than whatever computational
processes give rise to object representations. In other words, all
parties agree that the mind can “recover” or “infer” the per-
spectival properties of objects in one way or another (that, after
all, must be how artists and graphic designers are able to capture
3D images on 2D surfaces). Instead, the philosophical interest is
in whether such 2D perspectival properties are ever truly
“perceived”—rather than merely inferred, imagined, considered,
traced, judged, and so on. Yet, despite the long history and
philosophical centrality of this question (and even suggestions
that empirical data could be relevant; refs. 29, 40, and 41), all
such philosophical debates—in both their classical and contem-
porary incarnations—have traditionally involved only appeals to
introspection. For example, Schwitzgebel, a defender of the
distal-only view, writes of a rotated coin: “[A]s I stare at the
penny now, I’m inclined to say it looks just plain circular, in a
three-dimensional space—not elliptical at all, in any sense or by
any effort I can muster” (ref. 22, p. 590, also ref. 23). In a similar
vein, Smith writes: “the suggestion that pennies, for example,
look elliptical when seen from most angles is simply not true—
they look round” (ref. 34, p. 172).
The Present Experiments: Sustained Representation of
Perspectival Shape
Might empirical data address this fundamental and centuries-old
deadlock? Related work on perspectival shape and its interaction
with perceptual constancy has primarily relied on more qualita-
tive and effortful tasks (including carefully adjusting a shape to
match a target, drawing a copy of a shape, or issuing verbal re-
ports after various instructional manipulations; e.g., refs. 17, 18,
and 42–46), or has failed to isolate the key issue of interest. By
contrast, here we bring a different kind of evidence to bear on
this question. We reason that if rotated circular objects (as in
Fig. 1) truly exhibit a representational similarity to distally el-
liptical objects (i.e., objects that are elliptical both in 3D and in
2D), then they should impair visual search for those objects—a
faster and more easily quantifiable task that requires little effort
or special instruction. In other words, if a subject must locate a
distally elliptical object, they should be “distracted” by a rotated
circle whose projection matches the shape of their target, in ways
that would cause response-time (RT) differences. Alternatively,
if our minds do not represent the perspectival ellipticity of a
rotated coin and instead represent it only as the circular object it
truly is, then a rotated circular coin should not impair search for
objectively elliptical objects.
Here, nine experiments address this question, using real-world
and computer-based stimuli, static and dynamic depth cues, mul-
tiple shape classes, and both speeded and delayed responding. All
studies yielded results consistent with the former interpretation,
suggesting that the mind represents objects of matching perspec-
tival shape as being perceptually similar—and in ways that bear on
enduring philosophical questions about the role of subjectivity in
perception.
Experiment 1: Rotated Coins Impair Visual Search for
Elliptical Objects
Methods.
Open science practices. All data and materials for every experiment reported
here are available on the Open Science Framework, at https://osf.io/thj6y/ (47).
Fig. 1. A rotated circular coin.
†
“Perhaps the most fundamental and important fact about our conscious experience of
object properties is that they are more closely correlated with the intrinsic properties of
the distal stimulus (objects in the environment) than they are with the properties of the
proximal stimulus (the image on the retina). This is perhaps so obvious that it is easily
overlooked” (ref. 8, p. 312).
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Subjects.One hundred subjects were recruited online via AmazonMechanical-
Turk (for validation of this subject pool’s reliability, see ref. 48). All subjects
in all experiments provided informed consent and were compensated for
their contribution (either financially or with course credit). The experiments
were approved by the Homewood Institutional Review Board of Johns
Hopkins University.
Stimuli. The stimuli in this experiment (and experiments [Exps.] 2 through 7 as
well) consisted of highly realistic 1,000 px × 1,000 px images of the sort
appearing in Fig. 1, generated using Blender 2.79 (https://www.blender.org/)
and rendered using computational resources at the Maryland Advanced
Research Computing Center. Stimuli were presented scaled down to 60%
to better fit on subjects’ displays. Two objects—a target “coin” with an el-
liptical shape (aspect-ratio 1.41:1), and a distractor coin with a circular
shape—appeared atop two pedestals labeled “1” (left pedestal) and “2”
(right pedestal) (Fig. 2). The coins were generated with a waffle-like texture
on a metallic surface that produced realistic specular and Lambertian re-
flection, as well as cast shadows. Identical images with empty pedestals were
displayed during feedback and intertrial intervals (ITIs).
Procedure. On each trial, subjects saw an image with one target object (a
distally elliptical coin) and one distractor object (a distally circular coin). The
target elliptical coin was always presented head on, but the distractor circular
coin was presented either head on (on half of trials) or rotated 45° about its
vertical axis (on the other half of trials). The direction of rotation (clockwise
or counterclockwise) as well as the location of the targets and distractors
(pedestal 1 or 2) were counterbalanced across trials. Crucially, the objects’
sizes and degrees of rotations were chosen so that the perspectival shapes of
the elliptical coin and the rotated circular coin were identical (both projec-
ting a similar elliptical shape onto the “camera” that fixed the perspective of
the scene). Subjects’ task was simply to press whichever key (1 or 2) matched
the numeral on the pedestal carrying the truly elliptical coin—a task we
expected subjects to perform with near-ceiling accuracy.
Subjects had up to 1 s to respond. If they pressed a key, they received
feedback for 500 ms: the coins disappeared from the pedestals and the
image’s black bounding box turned green (correct) or red (incorrect); the
next trial then started automatically after 1 s. If subjects failed to respond,
the bounding box turned red and a “too slow!” message appeared above
the empty pedestals; subjects could then press the spacebar to begin the
next trial. There were six practice trials, followed by 104 experimental trials.
The logic of this design was thus as follows: If the rotated circular coin’s
shape is genuinely represented by mechanisms of perception and attention
as being similar to the shape of the head-on distal ellipse, then it should
serve as an effective distractor to a subject looking for a distally elliptical
coin, because its matching perspectival shape should compete with the
target for the subject’s attention. But if the rotated circular coin is seen as
just that—a circular coin—then it should not be a very effective distractor for
a subject searching for a distal ellipse.
After completing all of the experimental trials, subjects answered a four-
question survey in which they saw a single pedestal supporting either 1) a
head-on circular coin, 2) a head-on elliptical coin, 3) a circular coin rotated
45° clockwise, or 4) a circular coin rotated 45° counterclockwise (in this or-
der). For each image, they were asked to select one of two radio but-
tons reading “this is a circular object (viewed head on or at some angle)” or
“this is an oval object (viewed head on or at some angle).” (Note that,
though we use “ellipse” here in this paper, we used the more familiar [but
perhaps less precise] term “oval” in our instructions to subjects.) This survey
ensured that subjects appreciated the distal properties of the objects (e.g.,
to rule out that they misperceived the rotated circular coins as being dis-
tally elliptical). Readers can experience this task for themselves at https://
perceptionresearch.org/perspective/.
Exclusion criteria.We excluded any subjects who answered fewer than 80% of
experimental trials correctly or who gave any incorrect responses in the
postexperiment survey. We also excluded trials with incorrect responses or
response times below 100 ms. Though we took these steps to ensure high
data quality, none of the results we report here depended in any way on
these exclusions; in other words, all relevant effects reported below remain
statistically significant, in the same direction, even without excluding any
subjects or trials.
Results and Discussion. As expected, subjects found this task to be quite easy.
Accuracy was 97%, with a mean response time of 518 ms. In other words,
subjects identified the truly elliptical coin quickly and accurately.
However, an analysis of response times revealed a striking influence of
perspectival shape. Subjects took longer to identify the truly elliptical target
object when it was flanked by a rotated circular distractor whose perspectival
shape matched the perspectival shape of the target coin (mean RT = 542 ms)
than when it was flanked by a distally identical but head-on circular dis-
tractor whose perspectival shape differed from the perspectival shape of the
target coin (mean RT = 494 ms), t (63) = 12.48, P < 0.0001 (Fig. 3A). This
pattern of results was also highly consistent across subjects, with 94% of
subjects trending in the expected direction (Fig. 3B). In other words, for a subject
searching for an elliptical coin, a rotated circular coin (whose perspectival shape
Fig. 2. Task design for experiment 1. Trials started with two empty pedestals
labeled 1 and 2, followed by two “coins” appearing atop the pedestals. One of
the coins—the target—was always elliptical (here, appearing on pedestal 1).
Subjects’ task was to press 1 or 2 on their keyboard to indicate the label of the
pedestal supporting the target elliptical coin. The other coin—the distractor—was
always a circular coin that could appear head on (Left stream) or rotated (Right
stream). After subjects responded, the coins disappeared and visual feedback was
provided (green bounding box = correct [depicted]; red bounding box = incorrect
or no response). Note that, though we use “ellipse” in this paper, we used the
more familiar (but perhaps less precise) term “oval” in our instructions to subjects.
The images shown here are brightened for purposes of illustration. Readers can
experience the task as subjects did at https://perceptionresearch.org/perspective/.
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matched the shape of their target) was a more tempting distractor than a
head-on circular coin (whose perspectival shape did not match the shape of
their target), despite the fact that the circular distractor had the same distal
shape in both cases.
Importantly, there can be no question that subjects understood that the
rotated circular object was really a distally circular disk, since success on our
postexperiment survey required that subjects correctly identified the true
distal shapes of the stimuli. And, again, accuracy on the primary task was near
ceiling. This strongly suggests that subjects were not confused at all about the
true shapes of the stimuli, and that they were able to discriminate the el-
liptical target from the circular distractors.
In other words, these results—a robust slowdown when subjects had to
find an elliptical coin in the presence of a rotated circular coin—suggest that
subjects perceived the elliptical coin and the rotated circular coin as having
some property in common (even though they were otherwise completely
clear about the different distal shapes of both objects). We thus took this as
initial evidence that objects with similar perspectival shapes are represented
similarly in the mind, and that these representations are powerful enough to
guide attentional processes.
Experiment 2: Controlling for Correlated Properties
We have interpreted the results of experiment 1 as an influence of per-
spectival shape on perception and attention. However, another possibility is
that the observed slowdown instead reflected strategic responding based on
some other visual feature, such as area or width. For example, suppose
subjects in experiment 1 noticed that the head-on circular coin looked wider
(e.g., it had more golden pixels than the elliptical coin); in that case, they
may have used this heuristic as an initial response strategy (e.g., “if one of
the coins has fewer golden pixels, choose that one”) rather than focusing on
shape per se.
To rule out this and other similar strategies, experiment 2 repeated the
design of experiment 1, but this time the target and distractor coins could
have three different sizes: large (roughly 270 px in height, as in experiment 1),
medium (165 px), and small (130 px). All possible combinations were shown to
subjects during the experiment. For example, a large elliptical coin could
appear next to a medium-sized head-on circular coin, a small elliptical coin
could appear next to a large rotated circular coin, and so on. Fifty subjects
completed 96 experimental trials, with up to 2,000 ms to respond.
This design ensured that response strategies based on area, width, or other
such properties would not be effective, encouraging subjects to focus on the
objects’ shape per se. And indeed, we observed the same interference effect
here as in experiment 1, with faster RTs for an elliptical coin beside a head-
on circular distractor (685 ms) than for an elliptical coin beside a rotated
circular distractor (766 ms), t (24) = 6.15, P < 0.0001 (Fig. 4). This not only
served as an effective replication of experiment 1, but also suggested that it
was the similarity or dissimilarity in perspectival shape per se (rather than
some other factor) that drives these response-time differences.
Experiments 3 and 4: Object Rotation
A different alternative explanation of the present results is just that rotated
objects take longer to process than head-on objects, in ways that could
produce slower response times on any trials that have rotated objects in
them. For instance, objects may be inherently more difficult to recognize
when rotated from their canonical views (49, 50); or, subjects might have
resorted to mental rotation to normalize the noncanonically presented cir-
cular coin into its more familiar head-on presentation (21, 51). In that case,
slower responses in trials with a rotated circular distractor could have
resulted from the additional time taken to carry out such normalization
processes (52, 53), rather than because of matching perspectival shapes.
To rule out these and similar explanations, experiments 3 and 4 repeated
the design of experiment 1, but with the addition of different types of ro-
tated distractors. In experiment 3, the two possible distractor objects were a
circular coin rotated 45° about its vertical axis (as in the previous two ex-
periments) or a circular coin rotated 75° about the same axis. If rotation per
se is causing the slowdown for rotated circular coins, then a 75°-rotated coin
should cause a similar or even larger slowdown than the 45°-rotated coin,
because it was rotated even further off the frontal plane. But if the in-
terference is caused by matching perspectival shapes, then the 45°-rotated
coin should again cause the greatest slowdown (since the 75°-rotated coin
did not share the perspectival shape of the head-on elliptical coin).
In experiment 4, the two possible distractor objects were a circular coin
rotated 45° about its vertical axis (as in the previous two experiments) or a
square object (made of the same material) that was also rotated 45°. Again,
if rotation per se is causing the slowdown for rotated circular coins, then a
rotated square object should cause a similar slowdown. But if the in-
terference is caused by matching perspectival shapes, then the 45°-rotated
coin should again cause the greatest slowdown. Fifty subjects in each ex-
periment completed 96 experimental trials, with up to 1,000 ms to respond.
Both experiments revealed results that were consistent with the
matching-perspectival-shapes explanation, but not with the rotation expla-
nation. In experiment 3, subjects displayed faster RTs for selecting an ellip-
tical coin beside a circular coin rotated 75° (519 ms) than for an elliptical coin
beside a circular coin rotated 45° (to match the perspectival shape of the
target; 550 ms), t (38) = 5.37, P < 0.0001 (Fig. 4). And the same was true in
experiment 4: An elliptical coin was easier to find when it appeared next to a
rotated square (467 ms) than when it appeared next to a rotated circular
coin (530 ms), t (40) = 9.85, P < 0.0001 (Fig. 4).
These results provide further evidence that the interference is caused by
the representational similarity produced by similar perspectival shapes per se,
in ways that cannot be explained by low-level properties of the rotated
circular distractor such as area, width, or rotation itself.
Experiment 5: Dynamic Cues
The stimuli used in the foregoing experiments contained many rich pictorial
cues to depth and 3D shape, such as uniform textures that recede in depth
according to linear perspective, and realistic lighting and shading. And, in-
deed, such cues were easily sufficient for subjects to infer the distal 3D
properties of the objects, as indicated by answers on the postexperiment
surveys. However, being only static images on a display, it is possible that the
available cues produced less-than-fully vivid experiences of the objects’ distal
3D shapes. Indeed, object recognition in the world often involves dynamic
cues to depth and 3D shape, such as motion—whether generated by ob-
servers’ own movements (e.g., motion parallax) (54) or by the object itself
(55). Experiment 5 thus added such dynamic motion cues to the displays, to
further emphasize the 3D shape of the objects (and thereby make any in-
fluence of perspectival shapes that much more surprising).
Fifty subjects participated in experiment 5, which proceeded identically to
experiment 1 except that now the image shown on each trial was not a static
frame but instead an animatedmovie that showed the targets and distractors
oscillating back and forth about their vertical axes, in ways that produced a
more vivid experience of a 3D object in depth. The head-on objects (i.e., the
elliptical target coin and the head-on circular distractor coin) rotated 15°
clockwise and counterclockwise from 0°, traversing 30° of total rotation (5°
of rotation between each of seven frames). The rotated object (i.e., the
rotated circular distractor coin) rotated 6° clockwise and counterclockwise
A B
Fig. 3. Results of experiment 1. (A) Subjects were slower to select the el-
liptical coin’s position when it was flanked by a rotated circular coin whose
perspectival shape matched the target’s shape than when it was flanked by
the same circular coin seen head on. Bars indicate SEM of the difference
between head-on and rotated circular coin trials. ***P < 0.001. (B) Most
subjects (60/64) responded more slowly when the distractor was a rotated
circular coin. The graph plots the RT for selecting the elliptical coin flanked
by a rotated circular coin minus the RT for selecting it when flanked by a
head-on circular coin. Each bar represents one subject.
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from 45°, traversing 12° of total rotation (2° of rotation between each of
seven frames). These parameters ensured a match in the perspectival shapes
of the elliptical coin and rotated circular coin. The coins used during the final
survey also contained these dynamic cues.
Even with the addition of these rich, dynamic cues, distractors whose
perspectival shapes matched the target shape impaired search performance:
100% of subjects were slower to indicate the location of the target elliptical
coin when the distractor was a rotated circular coin (598 ms) than when the
distractor was a head-on circular coin (515 ms), t (33) = 13.20, P < 0.0001
(Fig. 4). This suggests that the results in previous experiments were not
simply driven by the absence of dynamic 3D shape cues, since here the same
effects arose even with richer dynamic cues.
Experiment 6: Delayed Responding
A potential concern about all of the preceding experiments is that, even if
they do show an influence ofmatching perspectival shapes on responses, they
do not demonstrate any “sustained” representation of such properties. In
particular, given that all of the preceding experiments explored only extremely
fast responses (with subjects encouraged to indicate the location of the ellip-
tical target coin as soon as they saw it, resulting in response times of ∼450 to
750ms), one possibility is that perspectival shapes have an influence only on the
very earliest stages of visual processing, and only for a very short time. In other
words, it might be that the rotated circular coin looks like an ellipse only very
briefly, and that this very brief elliptical appearance slows behavioral responses
only when those responses are themselves issued very rapidly. If this were the
case, it would perhaps undercut the relevance of these findings to the broader
theoretical questions under discussion, since those theoretical questions con-
cern more naturalistic (and unrushed) viewing conditions—as when Locke
considers what it is like “when we set before our eyes a round globe,” or when
Schwitzgebel considers his experience “as I stare at the penny now.”
To address this worry, experiment 6 proceeded just like experiment 5
(including dynamic depth cues), but this time subjects were prevented from
issuing a response until after viewing the coins for a certain period of time.
Here, the pedestals on which the coins were sitting began the trial blank
(i.e., without the numbers 1 and 2 on them), and remained blank for 1,000 ms
even after the coins appeared on top of them. Unlike previous experiments,
the numerals did not always appear on the same side; on half of trials, the
number 1 appeared on the left pedestal and the number 2 on the right
pedestal (as before), but on the other half of trials (randomly interleaved
throughout the session), the number 2 appeared on the left and the number 1
on the right. This forced subjects to wait for the labels to appear before they
could issue their responses, and so in turn forced them to look at the coins for
at least a full second (and often longer). One second is, even by the most
conservative estimates, far more than enough time to form a full-fledged 3D
representation of an object (56, 57). So, requiring at least this much time to
pass ensured that subjects’ visual systems would have fully processed the
coins’ 3D shapes before they could even begin preparing their responses—
which in turn ensured that whichever response they did end up giving would
reflect a representation of shape that was “complete.”
Nevertheless, the same pattern of results was observed: Subjects were
slower to indicate the location of the target elliptical coin when the distractor
was a rotated circular coin (537 ms after the onset of the numerals, and so
1,537 ms total viewing time) than when the distractor was a head-on circular
coin (521 ms after the onset of the numerals, 1,521 ms total viewing time),
t (34) = 5.57, P < 0.0001 (Fig. 4). Thus, even with more than sufficient time
(1 to 2 s) to form a full-fledged 3D representation of an object presented
with rich dynamic cues, perspectival shapes still affected perception and at-
tention, in ways that impaired performance on the task.
Note that, in some ways, this result is quite surprising: With sufficient time
to resolve the distal properties of the objects, one might not have predicted
this sort of sustained interference. One possibility (perhaps to be explored in
future work) is that subjects made new eye movements to the objects once
the pedestals’ numbers were revealed, in ways that “reset” shape constancy
computations; subjects may even be more likely to do this when rotated
objects are displayed. A different interpretation, though, might be to think
of these results as analogous to other more pervasive forms of persistent
interference, such as that which occurs in other well-studied phenomena
such as the Stroop effect (58, 59) or Garner interference (60).
For example, in the Stroop effect, the word for one color (e.g., “blue”) is
printed in a different color (e.g., in red ink); subjects who must report the
ink’s color are slowed by the mismatch between the text’s color and its
meaning—even though there can be no question that they clearly and un-
ambiguously see the text as red. Thus, these conflicting representations
(here, across the visual and semantic domains) continue to compete for the
subjects’ responses even after subjects have achieved accurate perception of
both the words themselves and the colors they are printed in, perhaps in an
Fig. 4. Results of experiments 2 through 7, all of which revealed a consistent and robust influence of perspectival shapes on perception and attention, even
when controlling for confounds that could potentially explain the results from experiment 1. These studies move beyond the idiosyncrasies of the predictivity
of object size (Exp. 2), the influence of rotation itself (Exps. 3 and 4), lack of rich dynamic cues (Exp. 5), sufficient time to form a 3D representation (Exp. 6), and
any one shape class (Exp. 7). Across these many studies, only the representational similarity between the target and the rotated distractor explained the
observed RT slowdown. Bars indicate SEM of the difference between trials with a head-on and a rotated distractor. ***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01.
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analogous way to our experiments. So, it may be that rotated circular coins
never stop appearing to have something in common with head-on elliptical
coins, even after their distal shapes are resolved, and that this induces a kind
of persistent response competition.
Perhaps even more related to the present phenomenon is Garner in-
terference. In Garner paradigms, subjects are shown stimuli that may vary
along two dimensions (e.g., hue and brightness), and they are asked to
discriminate the stimuli based on just one of those dimensions (e.g., to tell the
difference between a blue stimulus and purple stimulus, regardless of any
differences in brightness). If subjects can discriminate stimuli that vary along
only one dimension (e.g., dark blue vs. dark purple) just as easily as they can
stimuli that vary along two dimensions (e.g., dark blue vs. light purple), then
those two dimensions are taken to be fully separable and processed in-
dependently from each other. In contrast, if subjects take longer to dis-
criminate stimuli that vary along both dimensions than stimuli that vary along
only one dimension, then these dimensions are considered not to be fully
separable. Here, then, distal shapes and perspectival shapes might create a
kind of Garner interference: When a given object’s distal and perspectival
shapes match (e.g., a head-on ellipse that projects an elliptical shape or a
head-on circular coin that projects a circular shape), there’s no room for
these dimensions to interact and, hence, no interference. But when the
circular coin is rotated, its distal shape dimension and its perspectival shape
dimension differ. The results in experiment 6 with delayed responses are
consistent with distal and perspectival shapes being inseparable dimensions
in this sense: They cannot be processed in a way that is fully independent
from one another [a possibility that has recently been proposed by Lande
(31)]. This could potentially explain the persistently slower reaction times in
experiment 6 when a rotated coin is used as a distractor: Even after the true
distal shapes of the objects are inferred, they cannot be completely sepa-
rated from their perspectival properties, and so the representational simi-
larity between two objects with shared perspectival shapes continue to
interfere with subjects’ responses, even after the delay.
Experiment 7: Generalization to Other Shapes
The use of ellipses (of which circles are just a special case) to assess the
perception of perspectival shapes has a long history in philosophy and
psychology—as when Locke considers perception of a globe, or Kelly and
Schwitzgebel consider plates and coins. However, the broader question about
representational similarity between objects of matching perspectival shapes
concerns any type of shape. In fact, despite their wide use, ellipses have
sometimes been considered suboptimal for studying processes related to
shape constancy (1), because any distally elliptical object in the world can
project any elliptical shape on the retina—which could, in principle, hinder
shape constancy processes. Thus, even though subjects in the previous six ex-
periments correctly identified the elliptical target on nearly every trial (and we
analyzed reaction time only on those correct trials), it may be possible that the
observed response-time slowdown was due to difficulties efficiently achieving
shape constancy rather than due to a representational similarity between the
perspectival shapes of the elliptical coin and the rotated circular coin.
Importantly, however, these concerns do not apply to quadrilaterals—
which, unlike ellipses (or triangles), are very unlikely to produce identical
retinal images when their distal shapes are different, and which could per-
haps make shape constancy mechanisms more effective (1). Thus, to generalize
our results beyond ellipses (and rule out an alternative explanation of our
results due to their impoverished shape constancy), experiment 7 replicated
the design of the previous experiments, using trapezoids and squares instead
of ellipses and circles. The procedure and task design were the same as in
experiment 1, but here the target object was a head-on trapezoidal “canvas”
consisting of a textured white grid and a dark frame, mounted flush on a wall.
This target trapezoid was always presented next to a distractor: a head-on
square canvas that hung either flush against the wall (and hence projected a
square) or was hinged 45° toward the viewer, thereby projecting the same
trapezoidal perspectival shape as the head-on trapezoidal target. One hun-
dred subjects completed 96 experimental trials.
The experimental hypothesis was the same as before: trials in which the
subject’s trapezoidal target was flanked by a rotated square (whose per-
spectival shape matched the target) should result in slower responses com-
pared to trials where the same square distractor was seen head on (and,
hence, did not share its perspectival shape with the trapezoidal target). And,
in fact, exactly this pattern was observed: Subjects displayed slower RTs for a
trapezoidal object beside a rotated square distractor (520 ms) than for a
trapezoidal object beside a head-on square distractor (509 ms), t (59) = 3.00,
P < 0.01 (Fig. 4). This experiment not only replicated the results from the
previous experiments, but generalized them across shape classes, demon-
strating that these results were not due to any special properties of ellipses.
Experiment 8: Real World Objects under Naturalistic
Conditions
The preceding experiments demonstrate sensitivity to perspectival shapes per
se, as distinct from strategic responding based on width or area, difficulties
processing rotation, an absence of dynamic cues, an artifact of rapid responding,
or the idiosyncrasies of a particular shape class. However, all of these experiments
share the limitation that they involve only 2D images on computer monitors
rather than real 3D objects in the world. On one hand, this computer-graphics
approach allows for the creation of minimally paired stimuli (whose background,
lighting, and textures were certain to be identical), and fixing precisely proper-
ties such as relative size and angle of rotation. However, as images on monitors,
they could never be quite as vivid as real objects in the real world—which not
only provides an extremely rich environment in terms of cues to depth and 3D
shape (including stereopsis), but may also better map onto the scenarios that
Locke, Hume, Helmholtz, Gibson, and contemporary theorists have in mind
when they consider the experience of looking at a rotated coin.
For these reasons, experiment 8 shared the logic of experiments 1 through
7, but used a modified design that accommodated the use of real-world
objects rather than images on computer displays. We custom-manufactured
multiple wooden circular and elliptical disks and placed them on two cubby-
filled shelves at rotations designed to match (or not match) the disks’ per-
spectival shapes. Importantly, subjects viewed these real-world objects in
person, in a well-lit room, under highly naturalistic conditions. If a similar
pattern emerges even under these full-cue, real-world viewing conditions, this
would provide the strongest evidence yet that perspectival shapes are repre-
sented by mechanisms of perception and attention.
Methods.
Subjects. Ten subjectswere recruited from Johns Hopkins University. All subjects
provided informed consent and received course credit for their participation.
Stimuli. Sixteen wooden “coins”—eight elliptical (major axis: 11.43 cm; minor
axis: 8.08 cm) and eight circular (diameter: 11.43 cm)—were laser cut from
0.635-cm-thick oak planks using a Universal Laser Systems VLS 4.60 laser
cutter (Fig. 5). The coins were then sanded and varnished with shellac.
Fig. 5. Example stimuli used in experiments 8 and 9. Circular head-on (Left), elliptical (Center), and circular rotated (Right) laser-cut wooden “coins.” Though
this figure captures many of the cues available to subjects, readers are reminded that subjects in both of these experiments viewed these objects binocularly
(enabling stereopsis) and in naturalistic lighting; and experiment 9 allowed subjects the freedom to move their heads (enabling motion parallax). These
factors produced an extremely vivid perception of their 3D shape that a reader cannot fully experience on a screen or a printed page.
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Two black shelves (67.3 cm × 67.3 cm × 19.7 cm) with nine cubbies (each
20.7 cm × 20.7 cm × 19.7 cm, arranged in a 3 × 3 grid) were placed on a table
(1.5 m × 61 cm × 71 cm) at the end of a large room (7.3 m × 4.5 m) with
normal indoor office illumination (Fig. 6A). The shelves were parallel to the
wall and aligned with each other with a 20.3-cm gap between them. Black
cloth boxes covered this gap, and a 2.54-cm white circular plastic disk in the
middle was used as an orienting cue. The shelves were 2.5 m away from the
far end of another table with two large (6.35 cm in diameter) round re-
sponse buttons placed on it. The buttons (green and blue Orby switches by
P.I. Engineering) were connected via USB to a RaspberryPi 3 computer.
Subjects sat behind this table on a chair facing the display, with their heads
in a chinrest 33 cm above the surface of the table (such that their eyes were
positioned to experience the wooden coins as having their intended per-
spectival shapes). A head-on wooden coin viewed at eye height thus sub-
tended 2.62° of visual angle. Subjects could view the entire display (i.e., all
cubbies in both shelves) without needing to move their heads.
Each shelf contained eight objects (one per cubby, with the central one left
empty): four elliptical and four circular coins, eachmounted on a thin piece of
cardboard (not visible to the subject) that allowed them to stand upright and
be rotated as required (Fig. 6A). All of the elliptical coins, and two of the
circular coins in each shelf, were carefully angled to look head on from the
subject’s chair. The remaining circular coins were carefully angled to project
a similar outline as the elliptical coins from the subject’s point of view
(i.e., each ellipse and rotated circle projected a similar outline; but
depending on which cubby it was placed in, it required a different degree of
rotation relative to its cubby). The inner walls of the 16 cubbies containing
coins were covered with a black and white checkerboard pattern. Each cubby
had two light-emitting diode (LED) lights affixed to the subject-facing end of the
upper wall and were connected to a breadboard controlled by the RaspberryPi
(this equipment was also not visible to the subject). One LED was placed behind
the white circular orienting mark between the shelves. The experiment was
programmed in PsychoPy (v.1.83.04) using Python 2.7.13.
Procedure. The subject’s goal in the task was the same as in previous
experiments—to indicate the location of an elliptical coin—but the task
design itself differed (Fig. 6B). Each trial began with the central cue flashing
for 1,500 ms. This was meant to encourage subjects to begin every trial with
their eyes fixed in the middle of the display (though the logic of the ex-
periment did not depend on such fixations). Then, the LEDs of two cubbies,
one from each shelf, turned on (and remained on for the duration of the
trial). On every trial, one of the cubbies cued by LEDs contained a distally
elliptical coin (i.e., the subject’s target), whereas the other cued cubby
contained a circular coin (i.e., the distractor). On half of trials, the distractor
was a head-on circular coin; on the other half of trials, the distractor was a
circular coin angled to look 45° rotated on its vertical axis toward the sub-
ject. Subjects’ task was to select the shelf (left or right) that contained the
elliptical coin by pressing the corresponding left or right button on the table.
The logic of the design was the same as before: If perspectival shapes impact
perception and attention, then it should be harder to indicate the location
A
B C
Fig. 6. Design and results of experiments 8 and 9. (A) Sample configuration. Two shelves with eight elliptical and circular coins were placed in cubbies with
checkerboard patterns. Each cubby had a pair of LEDs, and one LED served as the central orienting cue. (B) Task design. After the cue between the two shelves blinked
for 1,500ms, one cubby per shelf was cued with an LED. One of the cued cubbies always contained an elliptical coin and the other one always contained a circular coin
(head on and rotated counterbalanced). Subjects pressed one of two buttons to select the shelf with the cued elliptical coin (Left or Right). Auditory feedback signaled
the correctness of their response. (C) Results. Subjects were slower to select the shelf with the cued elliptical coin when the other cued shelf contained a circular rotated
coin than when it contained a circular head-on coin, regardless of whether their head movements were restricted (Exp. 8) or not (Exp. 9). A video with sample trials
appears at https://perceptionresearch.org/perspective/. Bars indicate SEM of the difference between head-on and rotated coin trials. **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05.
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of the elliptical object when its foil is a rotated circular coin (whose per-
spectival shape matches that of the target) than when its foil is a head-on
circular coin (whose perspectival shape differs from that of the target).
The coin configuration in the shelves was determined a priori, and was
different for each subject. We created 16 different possible coin configu-
rations, and assigned a given configuration to a given subject pseudor-
andomly before any data collection began. The configuration remained
constant throughout that subject’s session. Three constraints were followed
when creating these configurations. First, the left and right shelves did not
contain the same type of coin in the same position (e.g., if there was an
elliptical coin in the upper left cubby of the left shelf, there was a circular
coin in the upper left cubby of the right shelf). Second, there was at least
one elliptical coin in each column and each row of each shelf. Third, no two
circular coins with the same rotation were next to each other. These pre-
cautions eliminated certain idiosyncrasies from any given configuration.
Subjects had up to 2,000 ms to respond after the LEDs cued the two coins.
They received auditory feedback about their response: If they responded in the
allotted time, they heard a short (300 ms), high-pitched sound for correct re-
sponses or a short (300 ms), low-pitched sound for incorrect ones. If they failed to
respond, they heard a long (1,500 ms), low-pitched sound. In either case, the next
trial started automatically, after 1,000 ms. Subjects got acquainted with the task
and feedback in 6 practice trials at the beginning of the experiment. These were
followed by 192 experimental trials, divided into two blocks with a 30-s break in
between. At the end of the experiment, subjects completed a survey adminis-
tered by the experimenter in which they were asked to identify the true shape of
a cued circular head-on coin, an elliptical coin, and a rotated circular coin (in this
order) by responding to the question “Is this a circular or an oval object?” Finally,
subjects’ stereoscopic depth perception was assessed with the circles test from the
Randot stereo test (Stereo Optical Company, Inc.), to ensure normal stereopsis.
A detail worth emphasizing about this design and setup is that subjects
saw the entire display (including all 16 wooden coins), with both eyes, in a
brightly lit room; the coins themselves were also textured and casting
shadows; and they appeared against a high-contrast textured background.
The conditions were thus ideal for experiencing them as 3D objects rather
than as 2D images. If the same interference effect still occurs under these
circumstances, it would be especially strong and especially relevant evidence
concerning the perspectival appearance of these objects. A video with
sample trials appears at https://perceptionresearch.org/perspective/.
Results and Discussion. Even under normal viewing conditions and after a long
exposure to maximally naturalistic stimuli, the pattern of results observed in
the previous computer-based experiments was observed here in a real-world
context. Subjects were slower to select the shelf with the cued elliptical coin
when a rotated circular coin was cued on the other shelf (655 ms) compared
to when a head-on circular coin was cued (624 ms), t (9) = 2.89, P = 0.018
(Fig. 6C). Moreover, 9 subjects’ RTs trended in the expected direction; perfor-
mance was at ceiling (mean correct responses = 96%); all subjects correctly
identified the true distal shape of the coins during the postexperiment survey;
and all subjects had normal stereoscopic depth perception as revealed by the
Randot stereo test (in which they correctly identified the test circle with a dis-
parity of 70 arcsecs or less; median = 40 arcsecs). The effect also persisted
throughout the experiment; for example, the mean RT difference between
trials with head-on and rotated distractors in the first block of trials was 26 ms,
and in the second block it was 35 ms (which, if anything, trends in favor of the
effect increasing, not decreasing). This suggests that the interference created by
matching perspectival shapes was impervious to practice and learning effects,
and thus extremely robust, persistent, and resistant to top-down control (since
knowing the objects’ true shape failed to eliminate the relevant effects) (61).
Thus, this experiment not only replicates the logic and design of the previous
seven experiments, but shows that such effects persist with real-world 3D
objects, seen under normal viewing conditions, by subjects with normal vision.
Experiment 9: Real World Objects with No Constraints
Though the previous experiment tested subjects under extremely naturalistic
conditions—using real 3D objects appearing in a fully lit room under binocular
viewing—they also included a head restraint so as to keep fixed the perspective of
subjects (and the perspectival shapes of the circular and elliptical coins). Though
this restraint ensured a high degree of precision with respect to perspectival
shape, it arguably prevented motion parallax cues, since the subject’s head was
not free to move. To even further enhance the naturalistic qualities of this ex-
perience, experiment 9 replicated experiment 8, holding constant every pro-
cedural detail except one: This time, subjects sat in the chair completely
unrestrained, such that they were able (if they wished) to move their heads in
ways that would generate motion parallax signals. This setup even more closely
resembled the conditions described by classical and contemporary theorists—since
the experience simply involved looking at tilted objects on a shelf, just as one
might outside an experimental context. And so if perspectival shapes interfere
here too, this would provide extremely strong and ecologically valid evidence that
perspectival shapes are represented by mechanisms of perception and attention.
In fact, subjects were slower to select the shelf with the cued elliptical coin
when a rotated circular coinwas cued on the other shelf (723ms) compared to
when a head-on circular coin was cued (687 ms), t (9) = 4.03, P = 0.003. This
result thus not only replicated the findings from experiment 8, but did so in
extremely—even maximally—naturalistic conditions.
Moreover, by providing sufficient time to process the scene, experiments 6
(delayed response), and experiments 8 and 9 (real-world conditions) also allow us
to rule out another alternative interpretation of our earlier results. A possible
explanation of the results fromour earlier experiments (1 through 5, and 7) was a
kind of competition for very early visual selection. For example, when searching
for a distally elliptical object, the visual system could prioritize processing of el-
liptical retinal images before other parts of a scene. If this were the case, elliptical
projections may attract more processing resources than projections that are
unlikely to be caused by distally elliptical objects; in that case, slower RTs could
arise in sceneswith a rotated coin not because the rotated coin retains an elliptical
perspectival appearance in any sustained way, but rather because of competition
for very early processes of selection and shapeprocessing. But, in experiments 6, 8,
and 9, subjects had plenty of time (from 1 s up to several minutes, rather than
milliseconds) to fully process the scene in front of them before making their
decision. Thus, even if therewas some competition only at the very earliest stages
of visual processing, that competition should have been resolved by the time of
the subject’s response. Yet, we still observed the characteristic pattern of shape
interference even under these prolonged-viewing conditions, suggesting that
perspectival properties genuinely persist in the mind.‡ In this way, these results
are perhaps consistent with recent views in the philosophy of perception
(e.g., ref. 31) holding that perception has an intrinsic “perspectival char-
acter” that simply never diminishes or falls away, and so may well predict
the kind of lasting interdependence between distal and perspectival
contents that we observe here.
General Discussion
Does a rotated coin look elliptical? Though this question has
been asked for centuries—since at least Locke and Hume—the
nine experiments reported here bring a different kind of evidence
to bear on it. Elliptical objects were harder to locate in displays
containing rotated circular disks than in displays containing head-
on circular disks (experiment 1). These results persisted even when
controlling for various low-level confounds—including size, width,
and area (experiment 2), as well as rotation itself (experiments 3
and 4)—and also occurred with dynamic depth cues (experiment
5), extra time to generate a stable 3D representation (experiment
6), and other shape classes (experiment 7). Finally, the same
pattern generalized from computer-graphics displays to the real
world itself, occurring in maximally naturalistic viewing conditions
with objects present for several minutes (experiments 8 and 9).
The explanation of these results seems clear and straightfor-
ward: An elliptical coin is harder to distinguish from a rotated
circular coin (vs. a head-on circular coin) because the two objects
appear to have something in common. More precisely, when subjects
see the rotated circular coin and the head-on elliptical coin, it can be
said that they bear a representational similarity to one another (31).§
‡Yet another, perhaps even more subtle interpretation of these experiments, is that
perception of the rotated coin switches back and forth between its distal and perspec-
tival shapes—rather than both interpretations coexisting simultaneously—almost like a
bistable figure. [This is roughly the view favored by Kelly (29).] Our findings cannot
confirm or disconfirm this interpretation relative to the “co-existing” interpretation.
However, we note that both of these views (i.e., coexisting distal and perspectival inter-
pretations vs. switching distal and perspectival interpretations) involve a commitment to
perspectival shapes not being discarded, and so both involve a considerably expanded
role for perspectival shape than is traditionally favored.
§To be even more precise, the results here indicate such representational similarity even
without specifying the dimension of such similarity, or the specific features that ground
this similarity. For many philosophical issues at stake here, it may be important to dis-
tinguish between interference caused by matching perspectival shapes vs. by persisting
retinal images themselves vs. by independent representations of ellipticity (31). Our
results here cannot adjudicate between these extremely subtle options; but all imply
some notion of representational similarity, which is what we take our results to
demonstrate.
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And so these results suggest that objects’ perspectival shapes not
only exist as images projected onto our eyes but also guide mech-
anisms of perception and attention, even once subjects have inferred
the true distal shape of objects in their environment.
One aspect of these results that bears repeating—and that
distinguishes them from previous work on perspectival shape
processing—is that they show the mutual interaction of distal
and perspectival shape representations using both highly precise
virtual stimuli (i.e., our computer-generated objects) and maxi-
mally naturalistic objects (i.e., our laser-cut wooden coins) pre-
sented under full-cue conditions. Previous work that explored
neighboring questions about shape constancy, perspective, and
object recognition used stimuli that were impoverished in at least
one of those ways—including work using simple 2D line drawings
(10, 15, 17, 18, 51), 2D “shapes” drawn in white noise on a plain
background (12), random-dot stereograms (62), objects pre-
sented monocularly (45), impoverished depth cues (45), after-
images (12–14), illusions (9, 13, 63), photographs (54, 64, 65),
simple and abstract virtual 3D objects (9, 55, 66), and real-world
3D wire objects (67). Importantly, all of these studies—including
those using real-world 3D objects (e.g., ref. 54)—presented
stimuli at durations lasting from a few milliseconds up to a few
seconds at most. In contrast, our stimuli were rich, highly re-
alistic, and in experiments 8 and 9 were presented for several
consecutive minutes (since the wooden coins were visible to
subjects for the entire experimental session). While the benefits
of limiting presentation duration, or using simple stimuli, are
clear and perhaps even necessary for certain questions in per-
ception research, the question that motivated Locke, Hume, and
more contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists is pri-
marily concerned with how we see “normal” objects, under
normal circumstances, for extended durations that permit close
perceptual scrutiny. The results from our computer-based studies
demonstrated representational similarity under more typical ex-
perimental conditions, whereas our studies with physical objects
demonstrated that such representational similarity does in fact
extend to normal viewing conditions in the real world.
Moreover, our studies achieve these results using indirect,
performance-based, and easily quantified measures derived from
a highly naturalistic behavior—locating an object—rather than
relying on more subjective, effortful, or instructionally sensitive
tasks (such as drawing copies of objects, adjusting standards to
match experimental stimuli, and so on). Visual search is, of course,
a relatively basic and fast process, but nevertheless it operates over
sophisticated and full-blown object representations (rather than
just low-level image features). For instance, under normal cir-
cumstances, visual search incorporates information about amodal
completion, such that search for a circle will be slowed by
distractors that are merely amodally completed circles (e.g., a
“Pac-Man” shape abutting a square, such that the square ap-
pears to be an occluding surface) (68). In that case, visual search
operates over the amodally completed object rather than its low-
level features. Furthermore, even in the simplest paradigms where
targets and distractors differ along just one feature (as ours do in
only shape), visual search recruits mechanisms of attentional se-
lection (69) that help disambiguate representationally similar ob-
jects (70). Thus, the attentional set brought to bear during visual
search makes higher-level representational features of objects
available to mechanisms of selection for action and awareness
(70–72). These characteristics of visual search suggest that the
interference we observed here reflects more than just similarity at
very “early” stages of visual processing (which would perhaps be
less surprising), and instead that perspectival shapes appear also at
higher levels of visual processing where attention, selection for
action, and visual awareness are likely to be involved.
What do these results imply? On one hand, there may be
something about these results that seems “obvious”; after all, the
rotated and elliptical coins project similar shapes on subjects’
retinas—why not think that this similarity would interfere with
other tasks? But on the other hand, this conclusion is surprising
indeed from the orthodox view that perception tracks distal
object properties rather than proximal ones. According to this
mainstream view, the retinal image (or a representation thereof)
is progressively transformed “to an object-centered reference
frame whereby retinal (information) is progressively removed
from the representation” (9), and it is this object-centered rep-
resentation that guides perception, attention, action, and so on:
“I act according to the inferred physical object [. . .] not
according to the brown patch in my eye” (7). If perspectival in-
formation were indeed truly absent from the object representa-
tions that inform perception and action, then subjects should not
be moved by the coin’s perspectival shape. And so the present
results are inconsistent with claims that we perceive distal prop-
erties only, or that there is nothing shared by two objects with dif-
fering distal shapes but matching perspectival shapes. Moreover, the
present results are not only inconsistent with certain claims about
object-centered reference frames in perception—they are also in-
consistent with introspective reports often found in the philosoph-
ical literature, such as those claiming that a rotated circular coin
“looks just plain circular, in a three-dimensional space—not
elliptical at all, in any sense or by any effort” (22). If the contents of
perception included only the distal shapes of objects, and never
their perspectival shapes, then a circular coin (head on, or not)
should not have any shared perceptual contents with an elliptical
coin. And so slowed search for an elliptical coin flanked by a ro-
tated circular coin should not occur on this view either.
Instead, and contrary to these positions in the philosophy,
psychology, and neuroscience of perception, the present results
suggest that we do not see the distal properties of objects in ways
that completely separate them from our point of view. Whereas a
rotated circular coin and an elliptical coin do not in fact have the
same shape in the world, they do share some property in com-
mon from our perspective, and our results show that the mind is
sensitive to that similarity. Perspectival shapes are sufficiently
present in perception to interfere with subjects’ search behavior
and attentional processing; but at the same time, they are suffi-
ciently distinct from the distal contents of our shape representa-
tions that they do not confuse subjects about the true properties of
objects. In other words, the sense in which the coin “appears el-
liptical” is not somehow false or illusory, since 1) the rotated coin
truly does subtend a solid angle of the same shape that a frontal
ellipse subtends, and is seen that way; and 2) subjects who have
this experience of the rotated circular coin do not then perceive
the presence of a distally elliptical object in the world. (After all,
much of our knowledge of distally circular objects does come from
encountering their often-elliptical projections, which the visual
system must exploit to accurately perceive such objects) (73, 74).
Taken together, these experiments address a foundational and
even philosophical question about the place of one’s perspective
in perception. But beyond this, they also show how certain
questions of this sort are open to empirical test (or at least can be
sensitive to empirical data). Just as a proper reading of the rel-
evant philosophical literature revealed that such questions have
not been answered by contemporary vision science (indeed, not
even by work that specifically explores viewpoint-dependent
models of object recognition), a properly aimed set of experi-
ments really can address these questions that were previously only
amenable to argument based on introspection. We thus believe
this work not only offers an answer to such questions, but also
serves as a case study of how empirical data can address philo-
sophical questions about the nature of perception itself.
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